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DETROIT SAVINGS BANK v. ZEIGLER.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS,
Supreme Court of Michigan:
DETROIT SAVINGS BANK v. ZEIGLER.
Such interchange of assistance between officers of a bank, as temporary need may
require, is fairly within the contemplation of the appointment of such an officer,
and the sureties on his bond are liable for a default made while he was temporarily
filling the place of another officer.
The receiving teller of the savings department of a bank, while filling the place
of the general teller, during the latter's temporary absences, embezzled moneys of
the bank: Held, that the sureties on a bond, given by him for the faithful perform-
ance of his duties, were liable for the money so taken.
ERROR to the Superior Court of Detroit.
John H. Bissell and Otto Kirchner, for appellant.
John -D. Coneley, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
COOLEY, J.-This suit is upon a bond given by defendant Her-
man H. Zeigler, as principal, etc., the other defendants as sureties,
to secure to the plaintiff the faithful performance of Zeigler's
duties as teller. The bond is dated February 10th 1877. The
penalty named is $5000, and the condition is as follows: "The
condition of this obligation is such, that whereas the above bounden
Herman H. Zeigler has been appointed receiving teller savings
department, and by the terms of the by-laws of said bank, is made
responsible for all such sums of money, property and funds of every
description, as may from time to time be placed in his hands Jy
the cashier, or otherwise come into his possession as receiving teller.
Now, therefore, the condition of the foregoing obligation is such
that if the said Herman H. Zeigler shall faithfully and honestly
discharge the duties of his said office, and shall faithfully apply
aad account for all such moneys, funds and valuables and shall
deliver the same, on proper demand, to the board of directors of
said bank, or to the person or persons authorized to receive the same,
then the foregoing obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in
full force and virtue."
At the time when this bond was given and Herman Zeigler
entered upon the performance of his duties, his brother, Charles
Zeigler, was the general teller of the bank. As such he had charge
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of commercial deposits and payments, and was also the superior
of Herman Zeigler, whose duty it was to account to him at the close
of each business day for the money received in the savings depart-
ment for that day. It seems to have been customary in the bank,
if for any reason the general teller was temporarily absent, for the
receiving teller of the savings department to take his place while
his absence continued, and the cashier of the bank testified that be
directed this, and understood it to be the duty of the receiving
teller of the savings department to comply with the direction.
Such temporary absences occurred while Herman Zeigler was such
receiving teller, and he took his brother's place while they continued.
The case shows that of the moneys which came to his hands while
thus temporarily acting for his brother, he embezzled a sum larger
than the penalty of the bond. His brother was privy to the embez-
zlement.
1. This suit is in assumpsit; and it is objected that assurnpsit
will not lie. That at the common law the action must have been
debt, is conceded; but the statute provides that "in all cases aris-
ing upon contracts under seal, or upon judgments, when an action
of covenant or debt may be maintained, an action of assumpsit may
be brought and maintained in the same manner in all respects as
upon contracts without seal." Comp. Laws, sect. 6194. Counsel
for the defence make an ingenious argument to convince us that
this statute is not applicable to a penal bond without covenants.
We do not agree in this. We think the intent of the statute is
made plain in its words: to permit the action of assumpsit to be
brought "in all cases" where before an action of debt might be
brpught on a contract under seal. This is such a contract and such
a case.
2. The second objection to a recovery is more specious, and goes
to the merits. It is that there has been no breach of the bond. The
moneys for which Herman Zeigler failed to account did not, it is
said, come So his hands as receiving teller' of the savings department
of the bank, or in the performance of his duties as such; but they
came to his hands while he was temporarily performing the duties
of another office. But this bond is not cbnditioned that he shall
faithfully perform the duties of any other office, or account for
moneys that might come to his hands by virtue of any other trust;
and his sureties can not be supposed to have contemplated when
they undertook to be responsible for his conduct as receiving teller
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of the savings department, that they were making themselves
responsible for his conduct in some other position, to which he might
be assigned, and of which the duties might be different and the
responsibilities greater. This, in short, is the argument for the
defence.
Abstractly considered, this argument is undeniable. The sure-
ties upon an official bond undertake for nothing which is not within
the letter of their contract. The obligation is stricti3simi Juris,;
and nothing is to be taken by construction against the obligors.
They have consented to be bound to a certain extent only, and their
liability must be found within the terms of that consent. Paw Paw
v. Eggleston, 25 Mich. 36, 40; -Detroit v. Leadbeater, 29 Id. 24;
Johnston v. Eiimball, 39 Id. 137; Bullocek v. Taylor, Id. 187;
United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet. 187; State v. Cutting, 2 Ohio
1; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N. Y. 593; Weonston v. State,
73 Ind. 175. This is familiar law, and rests. on sound reason.
But has this law any application to the facts of this case ? The
judge of the Superior Court thought it had, and turned the case
out of court. We are not satisfied he was correct in this.
The bank, it appears, was one which had two departments; a
savings department, and a commercial departmet. It had for both
one cashier and one general teller; and the money does not appear
to have been kept separate, but was brought daily into a common
fund. The receiving teller was subordinate to the general teller,
as well as to the cashier. The exact duties of the receiving teller
of the savings department do not seem to have been particularly
defined, except as the designation of the office would define them,
or as they would be indicated by the condition of the bond. He
was to be responsible for all such sums of money, property and
funds as the cashier might place in his hands as such teller, and
also for all such other money, property and funds as might otherwise
come into his hands as such teller. His duty was to account faith-
fully for all these. When the teller should stand at his desk and
receive savings deposits, he would of course receive them as receiv-
ing teller; and it might also be said that he would receive them
because they were placed in his hands by the cashier, who, as chief
financial officer of the bank, had placed him at that post. But
if the defence is correct in the view taken of this officer's duties,
it is not very manifest that the cashier could have bad any occasion
to intrust him with moneys otherwise. He simply received what
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was paid in, and handed it over to the general teller. What
occasion could have arisen for putting other moneys into his hands
as receiving teller merely ?
But we think this view is too restricted and narrow. -Every such
appointment is made with the general course of business in such
institutions in mind, and-it must contemplate that what is customary
will take place. If it is customary for one officer to assist another
when the need arises, we must assume that he expected to render
such assistance, and that by implication he undertook to do so as a
part of his official duty. And if he was bound to have this under-
standing of his undertaking and his duty, his sureties were bound
to have the like understanding. The number of officers of a bank
will vary with the extent of the business and with its needs. There
may be only a president and cashier, but there will commonly be a
teller, and there may also be a vice-president, assistant cashier, one
or more assistant tellers, and such number of book-keepers, messen-
gers and other assistants as the business may require. When a
cashier and a teller are sufficient for all the ordinary needs of the
bank, is a cashier performing an official act when, in the temporary
absence of the teller, he steps to the teller's place and receives a
deposit ? Or is the teller acting outside his duty when, under cor-
responding circumstances, at the cashier's request, he answers the
ordinary calls at the cashier's table. We think not. We think
any such interchange of assistance as temporary need may require,
is fairly within the contemplation of any appointment to such a
place, of the undertaking in accepting it and of any official bond
that might be given by the appointee. If this were not so, every
officer in a bank would require an assistant, or the business of the
bank would come to a stop whenever temporary illness or any
necessity whatever should, for any time, however short, take him
from his desk. We agree entirely with the defence that it is not
legally competent to impose new duties upon an officer to the pre-
judice of his sureties, but we do not think such a temporary assign-
ment is a case of that nature. The officer is merely giving the
temporary aid which must have been contemplated in his employ-
ment ;,'and if he were to refuse to give it when having no better
reason than that he did not consider it a part of his business, he
would have been likely to be regarded by his superiors as altogether
too unaccommodating for their purposes. It would not be too much
to expect a dismissal under such circumstances.
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We need not say whether a dismissal would be strictly justifiable,
for we do not think the needs of this case require a decision upon
that point. It is enough in this case to note that Herman Zeigler
did not refuse. As receiving teller of the savings department he
was called upon to take the place of the general teller temporarily,
and he took it and received moneys which be embezzled. The
moneys were confided to him by the cashier, because of his being
such receiving teller, and because in the opinion of the cashier,
which Zeigler himself did not contest, it was proper that he should
receive them under the circumstances. They therefore came to his
hands, because of his office and under circumstances justifying their
being confided to him as such. The cases of -fMinor v. M1fechanics'
Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Rochester aty Bank v. Blwood, 21 N. Y. 88;
and German-American Bank v. Auth, 87 Penn. St. 419, are in
point.
The judgment must be reversed with costs and a new trial
ordered.
The other justices concurred.
I. Two cases of importance have been
decided recently upon the liability of
sureties on official bonds. One was
decided in the New York Court of Ap-
peals, and is known as the National
Mechanics' Banking Association v.* Conk-
ling, reported in full in 15 Cent.
Law J. 373, for Nov. 10th 1882. The
other was decided in the Supreme Court
of Michigan, and is the particular case
to which -this note is appended. The
two cases taken together are illustrative
of the two general classes under which
the cases may be arranged which relate
to the liability of sureties on the official
bonds of private officers.
1. In the National .lfechanics' Banking
Association v. Conkling, supra, the facts
were as follows. A bookkeeper in a
bank had given bond conditioned for the
faithful discharge of his duties as such,
"or the duties of any other office, trust
or employment relating to the business
of taid association which may be assigned
to him." He was afterwards promoted
to the position of receiving teller, and
while acting in that capacity embezzled
the funds of the bank. The question
was, whether, according to the conditions
of thi bond, the sureties were liable for
the embezzlement thus committed. The"
question was a nice one, and the con-
clusion that they were not liable was
reached, as the court declared, "not
without some hesitation and doubt."
We doubt not the case was correctly
decided, the reasoning of the court is
•satisfactory and convincing. The recital
in such bonds undertaking to express the
precise intent of the parties, controls,
said the court, the condition or obligation
which foliows, and does not allow it any
operation more extensive than the recital
which is its key. London Assurance Co.
v. Bold, 6 Ad. & El. (N. S.) 514;
Hassell v. Long, 2 K. & S. 363; Pear-
sall v. Summersett, 4 Taunton 593;
Peppin v. Cooper, 2B.&A. 431"; Barker
v. Parker, 1 T. R. 287 ; Liverpool
Water Works Co. v. Atkinson, 6 East
507; Tradesmens' Bank v. Woodw-ard,
Anthon's Nisi lrius R., 2d. ed. 300.
""rhis is a case where the general words
subsequently used must be controlled and
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limited by the recital. Asuretyis never
to be implicated beyond his specific
engagement, and his liability is always
strictissimijuris, and must not be extended
by construction." Consequently the sure-
ties were not liable for a default com-
mitted after the appointment of their
principal to another position than that
of bookkeeper. They undertook for his
fidelity only while he was bookkeeper.
" But if, while bookkeeper, the duties
of any other office, trust or employment
relating to the business of the bank were
assigned to him, their obligation was
also to extend to the discharge of those
duties." The above case is, by reason
of the broad language of the condition
of the bond, a striking illustration of the
principle that the sureties on an official
bond are not liable for defaults committed
by their principal after his promotion to
a different position than that specified in
the bond. A principle of law about,
which there is no kind of doubt in ordin-
ary cases. See, Manufacturers' Bank v.
Dickerson, 41 N. T. Law 449, where the
bond was conditioned for the performance
of the duties of an assistant clerk in a
bank, and the principal was promoted
to the position of bookkeeper, the sure-
ties were held not liable for his default,
while holding the latter position.
2. The particular case, on the other
hand, represents another class of cases.
In that ease the bond was conditioned
for the faithful performance of the duties
of a receiving teller. The principal in
the bond was holding that office at the
time of the default, but was temporarily
acting as general teller, in the absence
of that officer, and while acting as such
was guilty of embezzlement. The bond
appears to have been loosely drawn.
Had it contained the condition which we
have seen was inserted in the bond in
National Mechanics' Banking Association
v. Conkling, supra, no question could
have arisen as to the liability of the
sureties. But notwithstanding the gen-
eral character of the bond the sureties
were held liable, and there can be little
doubt but that the holding was correct.
In Rochester City Bank v. Blwood, 21
N. Y. 88, the bond was conditioned for
the faithful discharge of the trust reposed
in the principal as assistant bookkeeper.
The court held it to be an engagement
that he would not avail himself of his
position to misapply or embezzle the
funds of his employer, and that it was
immaterial that the embezzlement was
committed while the bookkeeper was
keeping a journal, which, when he
entered upon his duties, and usually,
was kept by the teller, and that fraudu-
lent entries were made in such journal
to cover his default. In German-American
Bank v. Auth, 87 Penn. St. 419, the
question arose on the bond of a bank
messenger, conditioned that he should
conduct himself honestly and faithfully
as such messenger. The sureties were
held liable for money stolen byhim from
the bank, and it was held to be wholly
immaterial whether he was acting at the
time within the scope of his employment
as messenger or not. In Minor v.
Mlechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1 -Peters
46, it'ivas held that the official bond of
a cashier of a bank must be construed to
cover all defaults in duty which might
be annexed to the office from time to time,
by those authorized to control the affairs
of the bank: that the sureties in the
bond were presumed to enter into their
contract with reference to the rights and
authorities of the president and directors
under the charter and by-laws. Op-
posed to these cases stands the solitary
case, so far as we have been able to
discover, of Allison r. Farmers' Bank,
6 Rand (Va.) 204. In that case it was
held, by a divided court, that the sure-
ties were not liable for a felonious taking
of money by a bookkeeper, from the
drawer of a bank. The case was decided
upon the theory that the sureties did not
intend to bind themselves that their
principal should not commit a felony.
3. Intermediate between the two
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classes of cases abve considered comes
the recently decided case of the Home
Savings Bank v. Traube, 75 Mo. 199.
In that case it was held that the fact that
the bookkeeper of a bank performed the
duties of teller also, would not relieve
the sureties in his bond, which bad
been given for the faithful performance
of his duties as bookkeeper, from liabil-
ity for errors committed in that capacity,
unless the errors were in some way
connected with some proper act on his
part as teller, or were superinduced by
his employment as such.
4. In Union Bank v. Clossey, 10
Johns. 271, s. c. 11 Id. 182, the bond
was conditioned that the principal would
"well and faithfully perform the duties
assigned to and trust reposed in him, as
first teller," &c. It was held to apply to
his honesty and not to his ability, and
that the sureties were not liable for a
loss arising to the bank from his mistake,
but only for a breach of trust. In
American Bank v. Adams, 12 Pick. 303,
it was held that a bond faithfully to per-
form the duties of teller bound the
obligors to a responsibility for reasonable
and competent skill and due and ordinary
diligence in the performance of his office
and. not for his honesty alone. In Minor
v. Mechanics' Bank of Alexandria, 1
Peters 46, the condition of an official
bond that he should "well and truly"
execute the duties of cashier, was held
to include not merely honesty but reason-
able skill and diligence. In Batchelor
v. Planters' National Bank, 78 Ky. 435,
after asserting a cashier's duty to super-
vise the action of his subordinates, it is
said: "The acceptance of the cashier's
bond does not preclude the bank or its
directors from designating the business
of a subordinate, and the character of
the work to be done by him. When not
interfering with the duties properly
belonging to the cashier, such action on
the part of the board cannot affect the
liability of the sureties, and if in. the
opinion of the board, the subordinate can
discharge the duties of both the teller
and general bookkeeper, his appointment
to both positions will not release the
sureties of the cashier, although the bond
may have been executed when the sub-
ordinate was acting only in the one
capacity."
II. It may be interesting in this con-
nection to refer briefly to some of the
principles which govern the liability of
sureties on the official bonds of public
officers.
1. It seems to be held in general that
the liability of public officers is absolute
for the moneys received by them in their
official capacity. The fact that they may
have been robbed, or the money stolen
through no fault or neglect upon their
part, or that the bank in which they kept
their accounts has failed, is no excuse for
a failure to pay the money over:. Cox v
Blair, 76 N. 0. 78; Havens v. Lathene,
75 Id. 505 ; State v. Clarke, 73 Id. 255 ;
Perley v. Muslegon, 32 Mich. 132 ; Com-
monwealth v. Conly, 3 Penn. St. 372;
Taylor v. Morton, 37 Iowa 550: Union
v. Smith, 39 Id. 9 ; County of Redwood
v. Tower, 28 Minn. 45; County of
Hennepin v. Jones, 18 Id. 199 ; County
of McLeod v. Gilbert, 19 Id. 214;
Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 30 Ill.
99; United States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall.
182; United States v. Prescott, 3 Id.
587; United States v. Keelder, 9 Id.
83; Boyden v. United States, 13 Id. 17;
United States v. Thomas, 15 Id. 337;
Morbeck v. State, 28 Ind. 86; Rock v.
Stinger, 36 Id. 346 ; Steinback v. State,
38 Id. 483; New Providence v. Me-
.Eachron, 33 N. J. Law 339; Colerain
v. Bell, 9 Mete. 499 ; 3uzzy v. Shat-
tucki, I Danio 233; and State v. Harper,
6 Ohio St. 607. The subject was con-
sidered by the Supreme Court of Maine
in 1879, and a contrary conclusion was
reached: Cumberland v. Pennell, 69 Me.
357. His liability was there held to be
that of F bailee for hire.
In State v. Clarke, 73 N. C. 255, it
was held that county commissioners had
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no authority' to release a sheriff from his
obligation to pay over county moneys
which had been lost or stolen through
no fault of his. In Board of Education
v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227, it
was held to be in the power of the legis-
lature to grant such relief. But in
People v. Supervisor, 16 Mich. 254, and
in Bristol v. Johnson, 34 Id. 123, it was
held that the legislature had no such
power, as it amounted to the auditing
of a private claim, a thing forbidden by
the constitution of that state.
2. Where a public officer executes an
official bond which is not required by
statute, such bond is void for want of a
consideration: State t. Heisey, 56 Iowa
404. And where a statutory bond goes
beyond the requirements of the statute,
it is, for the excess, without any obliga-
Otory force: United States v. Ellis, 4
Sawyer 592. Where an officer is required
to perform a duty special in its nature,
and to give a special bond for its faithful
performance, no liability attaches to his
general bondsmen for a default in the
performance of the special duty, in
the absence bf any declaration that they
shall also be liable: Board of Super-
visors v. Ehlers, 45 '"is. 281 ; Common-
wealth v. Toms, 45 Penn. St. 408; State
v. Johnson, 55 Mo. 80; Williams v.
Mor(on, 38 Me. 52; State v. Young,
23 Minn. 551; State v. Corey, 16 Ohio
St. 17; Henderson v. Coover, 4 Nev.
429 ; Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302;
People v. Moon, 3 Scam. 123.
3. Where the statute prescribes that an
officer shall hold during a stated term,
and until his successor is elected and
qualified, the question arises, whether the
sureties will be liable for delinquencies
committed after his stated period has
elapsed, but before his successor has
been appointed or qualified ? The author-
ities are not harmonious. Some few cases
hold that the sureties will continue liable
after the stated.period has elapsed, and
until the successor has been actually ap-
pointed and qualified: Long v. Seay, 72
Mo. 648; Thompson-v. State, 37 Miss.
518 ; Statev. Berg, 50 Ind. 496 ; Placer
County v. Dickerson, 45 Cal. 12; State
v. Daniel, 6 Jones (N. 0. Law) 444;
Sparks v. Bank, 9 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 365. But if the officer is him-
self re-elected or re-appointed, and thus
becomes his own successor, and fails to
give a new bond, the sureties on the
original bond will not be liable for a
default occurring in the second term:
Savings Bank v. Hunt, 72 Mo. 597;
Harris v. Babbitt, 4 Dillon 185.
The weight of authority, and the
better considered cases, hold that the
bond is only intended to cover the reason-
able time necessary to enable a successor
to be elected and qualified, and that if a
default takes place after such reasonable
time has elapsed, the sureties will not be
liable: Bigelow v. Bridge, 8 Mass. 275 ;
Chelmsford v. Demarest, 7 Gray I ; Dover
v. Twombly, 42 N. H. 59; Welch v.
Seymour, 28 Conn. 387 ; State Treasurer
v. allann, 34 Vt. 371 ; Mayor, 6-c., v.
Horn, 2 Harr. (Del.) 190 ; Insurance
Co. v. Smith, 2 Hill (S. C.) 590; South
Carolina Society v. Johnson, 1 MeCord
41 ; Committee of Public Accounts v.
Greenwood, 1 Desaus. (S. C.) 450;
County qf Wapello v. Bingham's Adm'r,
10 Iowa 40; Council of Montgomery v.
Hughes, 65 Ala. 201 ; Harris v. Babbitt, 4
Dillon 185. In the case last cited, Mr.
Justice DisLoN says that even if a con-
trary rule should be recognised in the case
of public officers, and he appears to be
clearly of opinion that it should not, it
certainly should not be adopted in the
case of officers of private corporations
whose continuance in office under sucb
circumstances would be due to the
neglect of the officers entrusted by the
corporation to manage its affairs. The
results of their negligence should be
visited upon the corporation, and not
upun the sureties. A leading case on
this whole subject is that of Lord Arling-
ton v. Merricke, 2 Saund. 403, which
came before Lord llE. The bond
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recited that the principal had been
appointed deputy-postmaster for the
term of six months, and was conditioned
f6r his good behavior during all the
time he should continue deputy-post-
master. He continued in office two
years, and made default. The sureties
were held not liable. See, too, Kitson
v. Julian, 4 E. & B. 854.
4. While sureties are not liable by
reason of the subsequent imposition
by statute of new and different duties
materially changing the character of the
office, they are nevertheless liable for
the faithfal discharge of the duties of the
officer, existing at the time of signing
the bond, where those duties have not
been substantially or materially changed.
The bond remains a binding obligation
for what it was originally given to
secure: Gaussen v. United States, 79
U. S. 584 ; United States v. Kirkpatrick,
9 Wheat. 720 ; Commonwealth v. olmes,
25 Gratt, 771 ; Supervisors oJ Monroes
aountj v. Clarke, 25 Hun 286: Hatch
v. Attleborough, 97 Mass. 533; Peo-
ple v. Vilas," 36 N. Y. 459. The case
of Pqbus v. Gib~b, 6 B. & B. 902,
is not recognised.as good law in this
country. In that case the bond was
given for the faithful discharge of the
duties of high bailiff, the jurisdiction of
the court being fixed, by statute. After
the giving of the bond the jurisdiction
of the court was enlarged, materially
altering the duties of the bailiff. The
sureties were held not even liable for
misconduct, which was within the juris-
diction of the statute in force at the time
the bond was given. To that extent
it would seem to be opposed to the
American authorities.
In Alabama, under the Code, sureties
are liable for acts done in the discharge
of duties subsequently imposed: 3llorrow
v. Wood, 56 Ala. I ; M1cKee v. Griffin,
66 Id. 211.
5. The general rule, of course, is
that sureties are only liable for a defal-
cation which takes place during the term
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for which the bond was given: Stern v.
People, 96 Ill. 475; Bissell v. Saxton,
66 N. Y. 55. And the sureties will not
be made liable for a defalcation during
a preceding term by the fact that their
principal had, during the term for which
the bond was given, property out of
which he might have provided funds to
make good the default: Bissell v. Sax-
.ton, 77 N. Y. 191. Where an officer
has misappropriated funds during his
first term, and in his second term
actually pays into the public treasury all
the funds received by him during such
second term, but applies a portion of
such funds to the extinguishment of the
liabilities incurred by him during his
first term, the sureties on the second
bond will be liable to the extent of such
appropriation: State v. Sooy, 39 N. J.
Law 539; Seymour v. Van Slyck, 8
Wend. 403; s. c. 15 Id. 19 ; State v.
Smith, 26 Mo. 226; Inhabitants of Sand-
wich v. Fish, 2 Gray 298; Gwynne v.
Burnel, 7 Cl. & Fin. 572 ; Attorney-
General v. Manderson, 12 Jur. 383. In
Hoboken v. Kamena, 41 N. J. Law 438,
an officer was a defaulter during his first
term, and it was sought to hold the
sureties on the bond for the second term.
Counsel urged, as matter of law, that
the money received during the second
term must be considered as appropriated
to make good the misappropriations of
the first term, and that, thereby, it would
appear that he had not faithfully and
truly performed all the duties of the
second term. The court, however,
viewed the subject in a different light,
and the sureties for the second term
were held not liable.
6. Where an officer holds for several
consecutive terms, and is found to be a
defaulter at the end of his last term, it
will be presumed, in the absence of
proof, that the entire default occurred
during the last term : Kelly v. State,
25 Ohio St. 567 : Kaqay v. Trustees of
Schools, 68 Ill. 75. If, at the com-
mencement of his second term, he reports
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a certain sum in his hands, and gives
bond to account for and pay over moneys
coming to his hands during the term, the
sureties on the bond for the second term
will be responsible for the money so
reported to have been in his hands, and
will not be allowed to show that the
defalcation in fact occurred during a
previous term, so as to throw the liability
on the sureties for the first term: Roper
v. Sangamon Lodge, 91 Ill. 518; Cawley
v. People, 95 Id. 249 ; Morley v. Town
of Mfetamora, 78 Id. 394 ; and see
Board of Education v. Fonda, 77 N. Y.
359 : United States v. Boyd, 15 Pet.
187. Where the officer fails to make a
report at the close of his first term, and
to make a settlement, it will not be pre-
sumed that he paid the funds of the first
term to himself as his successor, and the
sureties on the first bond will be liable:
Coons v. People, 76 Ill. 383.
7. Sureties on the official bond of a
public officer are liable for acts done
Vnrtute offlcii, but not for those done eotore
officii: Huffeman v. Kopelkoin, 8 Nab.
344; Ottenstein v. Alpaugh, 9 Id. 237.
The liability of sureties on official
bonds is not generally measured by the
law requiring the sureties, but by that
imposing the duties on the officer: Dyer
v. Cozington Township, 28 Penn. St. 186.
. Of course no action can be maintained
on an official bond for any misfeasance
of any officer which is not within the
terms of the condition of the bond, or
in contemplation of the law requiring
the bond: Furlong v. State, 58 Miss.
717.
8. In Vann v. Rpkin, 77 N. C. 408,
the law fixed the term of office at t&o
* years, but required the bond to be re-
newed annually. The bond was given
in September 1872, but was not renewed
in September 1873, although the prin-
cipal continued in office. The statute
declared that a failure to renew the bond
should create a vacancy in the office.
The bond was conditioned for the faith-
ful collection and payment of the taxes
received during his term of office. The
default occurred in 1874. The sureties
were held liable. The court said the
failure to renew the bond did upt of
itself create a vacancy in the office, and
that it was necessary that proceedings
should first be taken to declare the office
vacant.
HENRY WADn ROGERS.
United States Circuit Court, Northern District of Texas.
LAWRENCE v. NORTON.
An assignment for the benefit of those of the assignor's creditors who should
release him, with a reservation of the surplus to the assignor himself, is fraudulent
and void as to the creditors not releasing.
Statutes allowing preferences among creditors should be strictly construed, and
assignments creating such preferences should be held vpid, when not in strict com-
pliance with the terms of the law.
A Texas statute authorized any debtor to make an assignment for the benefit of
such of his creditors only as would consent to discharge him, and provided that in
such case the benefit of the assignment should be limited to such creditors. Held,
that the statute must be confined in its operation to assignments which transferred
all of the debtor's property for the benefit of creditors, and did not validate an
assignment by which the debtor reserved to himself an interest Mn the surplus after
paying the releasing creditors.
